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Equity Considerations In Fiering's Prototype
water System
Fiering (1974) presented a didactic model of a water
system to illustrate upstream and downstream trade-offs in
power generation versus flood control. Wood (1974) later
extended the model to a two-season analysis, related the model
to actual problems on the Tisza River basin in Hungary and
raised such questions on bargaining as:
- where does bargaining start?
- how do sidepayments extend the range of choice?
- are utilities for certain sidepayments equal to
utilities for expected benefits?
If Fiering's system is put in the context of an international
river basin then the game-theoretic approach of Rogers (1969)
provides a method of outlining strategies for each participant
for both non-cooperative and cooperative development of the
basin. This approach runs into difficulty, however, if:
1. One of the participants in 'The Game' is at a
distinct disadvantage in relation to the other; in Fiering's
example the downstream dyke construction is highly dependent
upon both upstream reservoir construction and operation strategy.
2. One country is weaker than the other; in the
India-Bangladesh model there was little prospect of a sidepayment
from Bangladesh to India, thus restricting the range of choice.
3. The game is repeated i.e., where development is not
a one-shot affair with a single decision, rather a recursive
decision process with repeated dyke and reservoir constructions.
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4. One desires a solution that is not just efficient, but
also 'equitable' to both participants.
With growing concern for equitable development and the
redistribution of wealth (particularly across international
borders) the question is how can cooperative development occur
with 'equity' joining the list of multiple objectives? Besides
addressing the bargaining issues raised by Wood, this paper will
briefly outline the problem of equity related to:
criteria for wealth distribution
cooperative and non-cooperative games
value of information and risk sharing
negotiation strategy and budgetary constraints
opportunity costs and staged versus single development
equalization schemes and the 'incremax technique'
game theory with a 'weak' apponent
1. Equity and the Distribution of Wealth
A distinction must be made between an 'equitable solution'
and a solution which 'redresses inequity'. An equitable solution
may be one in which the decision outcome has some measure of equity
or fairness to all participants (eg. an allocation of water
shortages to regions along a river using goal programming).
A procedure which redresses inequity is one in which the
status quo (ie. inequity) is altered via negotiation to some new
position deemed 'less inequitable'. The 'incremax' procedure
discussed below is an example of a technique to redress inequity.
The principle of 'equity' implies an even distribution of
wealth. Problems of equitabte development on a river basin must
therefore be approached by the use of techniques for wealth
distribution.
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The question is does one divide up the resource itself, or
simply share the benefits due to exploitation of the resource?
In the context of the example presented in this discussion, J
several questions come to mind:
1. What is an 'equitable' division of reservoir storage
between flood and power uses, particularly if the power
generation and flood locations are separated by an international
border?
2 .. If water allocation under shortage is based on today's
production functions, how are future development options A
foreclosed?
3. If equity or efficiency implies a transfer of wealth
(sidepayment) then how does utility for a certain sidepayment
compare with utility for expected benefits?
4. Does 'equity' imply equal net benefits for both
riparians, equal gross benefits, or is it related to some other
characteristic of the riparions, GNP for example? Further, if
two riparians are in inequitable positions before the development
decision (say, one country is underdeveloped) how should benefits
from common development be transferred to the underdeveloped
country?
5. From the set of solutions identified by Wood in
Figure 1, which solutions are 'more equitable' than others and
what other solutions (if any) are also equitable?
2. Criteria for Wealth Distribution
There are no rational, objective criteria for determining
patterns of distribution of:wealth accruing from the exploitation
of water resources. Some of the ones most frequently advanced
are noted below:
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Proximity or Riparian Position:
The proximity of water resources to a country's boundaries
are generally the most important criterion for claiming a share
of benefits. Furthermore, upstream countries traditionally claim
little responsibility for downstream disbenefits due to upstream
actions (pollution, floods, etc.)
Manageability:
It is sometimes stated that one riparian is in a better
position to manage a water resource than another. In certain
situations, one country may claim that control of an anadromous
species of fish(i.e., those spawning in fresh waters} is best
exercised by one state, yet this is hardly justification for
allocation of the entire proceeds of exploitation.
Historic Rights:
Past use is often advanced as a basis for future distribution
patterns. As an example, to counter this, power quotas, allocated
from a joint venture on an international border, can obviously be
reviewed as demand functions in the riparian countries change.
Need:
Many states advocate that they require a higher share of
wealth because they have a greater dependence on the benefits
Ｈ ･ Ｎ ｧ ｾ ｰ ｯ ｷ ･ ｲ Ｌ fish catch) for food, employment, income, etc. The
real question is how to define need. What percentage of income,
protein or employment should a state derive from a resource in
order to qualify as being dependent on it?
Capacity to Exploit:
The criterion of exploitability tends always to favour the
larger nation with the better technology, demand and infrastructure.
This criterion alone has led to the severe depletion of many of the
world's anadromous fish species.
*Figure 1 : Extending The Pareto Surface with Sidepayments
and two Bargaining Schemes.
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Common Heritage:
A final criterion, although little applied, is the one
that provides that water resources are for the benefit of all
mankind and benefits should in some way be shared by all states
of the world. An example is the right to navigation by all nations
on the Danube.
An Example of Resource Distribution:
In the case of international fisheries in the Northwest
Atlantic, the fifteen member states of the International Commission
agreed to distribute the wealth of fish stocks on the basis of an
arbitrary formula. Fourty percent of the total allowable yield
was distributed in the basis of catches over the past 10 years
(Historic), 40 percent on the basis of catches over the past
3 years (Historic), 10 percent was reserved for the coastal state
(Proximity) and 10 percent on the basis of special considerations
(Need) or for the interest of new members (Common Heritage).
There is nothing to say that this is the best allocation, nor
that it can be monitored and enforced, yet it is an example of
wealth distribution.
One would suspect that the analogy to the above example in the
case of international river basins would be limited to transient
fish stocks. There is a strong case, however, for water quantity
distribution using the criterion of need by underdeveloped
countries on river basins (eg. Mexi.co on the Colorado and Rio
Grand Rivers).
In the case of water allocation, Gouevsky apparently is
examining equitable distribution of water between industry,
agriculture and municipal uses during periods of shortage. A
related problem is how tOdlstribute shortage across borders and
between different uses.
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3. Cooperation and Non-Cooperation
Looking back at Fierings' Model, for the upstream (US)
riparian, the decision K=4, F=O in Table 1 clearly dominates
all others. Knowing this decision, the downstream (DS) riparian
would likely decide D=5 to maximize net benefits.
As a two person non-zero sum game without cooperation this
pure strategy leads to an equilibrium at solution number 6
since departure from this solution would not increase net
benefits to one participant without reducing those of the other.
Several questions arise:
1. What is the effect of budgetary constraints on the
equilibrium points?
2. Can the positions of both participants be improved by
cooperation?
3. Do questions of 'equity' affect the final decision?
We know that the payoffs may change, but will the decision
itself vary?
4. What happens to the game if the two participants have
different perceptions of payoff values as a consequence of
employing different data bases, interest rates or optimization
techniques?
4. Value of Information
Given the information that upstream has decided not to build
the reservoir (K=O), downstream can then take the decision D=6
and gain .63 marginal net benefits over a D=5 decision. One
might at first suggest that knowledge of the K=O decision is
worth no more than .63 to downstream. This might be so if the
D=6 decision were truly independent of the D=5 decision.
Upstream Decision Downstream Decision
DYKE SIZE
Reservoir Operating
D=4 D=5 D=6 D=7S.ize Rule
K=O 0,0 0,5.93 0,6.56 0,-1.88
1 2 3 4
K=4 F=.O 28.57,7.03 28.57,9.37 28.57,7.49 28.57,-1.88
5 6 7 B
..
K=4, F=.25 27.48,11.09 27.48,11.40 27.48,7.96 27.48,-1.88
9 10 1 1 12
K=4, F=.50 26.85,11.25 26.85,11.24 26.85,7.81 26.85,-1.88
13 14 15 1 6
TABLE 1: Payoffs for Upstream and Downstream 1.
1. From Wood, 1974. The entries indicate upstream, then downstream net
benefits. Solution numbers in lower right hand corners.
.'
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Clearly they are dependent; suppose a 0=5 decision were taken
and construction started. Upstream then announces a K=O
decision and OS switches to 0=6. The revised cost of 0=6 due to
design changes etc., is likely greater than the 10 it would have
cost to start with 0=6 at the beginning. So the cost of the
information is the .63 marginal net benefit less the added costs
from design changes.
Suppose OS was relatively underdeveloped, a criterion for wealth
transfer might be that US must announce its strategy first (i.e.
information transfer) so that OS can act so as to seek its best
outcome in Table 1. Upstream can only deviate from its initial
committment if Pareto-optimality is guaranteed.
5. Opportunity Costs
For each upstream decision OS can choose an optimum strategy
from Table 1. If OS makes his decision first, however, without
knowing the US decision, then OS may end up with a sub-optimal
decision. Table 2 illustrates the net benefit foregone by OS
for each value of 0, K and F if the wrong decision is chosen.
Some of the foregone benefits, however, are recoverable, simply
by adding on a unit of dyke; others are not, particularly if
dykes are built too large. Some questions arise:
1. How risk adverse is the downstream decision maker?
Whereas net benefits are lower, in general, for a 0=4 decision,
the benefits foregone due to an error are entirely recoverable.
Perhaps for the sake of equity one of the participants can simply
absorb the risk as a proxy for wealth transfer.
2. How much are the r,ecoverable benefits decreased by
higher staging costs (i.e. it woald likely cost more to build 2
units of dyke, than add 1 unit later, than build 3 units from the
start)?
3. Can the dyke-dam construction strategies be viewed as
an n-stage recursive decision process as shown in Figure 2) and
how long should the planning horizon be? The issue here is that
a dyke-dam decision cannot be an isolated event due to the repeated
II II
nature of development (as in the KOROS basin, for example, where new
dykes repeatedly made the previous constructions redundant).
UPSTREAM Decides Second:
DOWNSTREAM K=O K=4 K=4 K=4 ,
Decides First:
- F=O F=.25 F=.5
D = 4 6.56 2.34 .31 0
(6.56) (2.34 ) ( . 31) 0
D = 5 .63 0 0 .01
( • 63) (0) (0 ) (0)
D = 6 0 1.88 3.44 3.44
I
I (0) (0 ) (0 ) (0 )
D = 7 8.44 11.25 13.28 13.13
(0) (0) (0 ) (0 )
TABLE 2: Downstream Opportunity Costs
NOTE: The table entries indicate net benefits foregone due to
a poor decision. Numbers in brackets are recoverable benefits if
dyke unites) are later added.
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Figure 2: Dam and Dyke Decisions as a Recursive Decision Process.
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6. Bargaining:Package Deal or Two Stage Decision?
Given a US decision K=4, F=O, from Table 1 DS would likely
decide on D=5 leading to solution 6. Clearly DS would prefer an
F=.25 decision by US and might press for solution 10. It thus
appears that both DS and US agree that K=4 is the best 'design'
solution, but are at odds over the 'operating' policy. In a
bargaining session it might well turn out that both parties agree
on the K=4 decision now, yet decide to reserve judgement on the
operating policy unit at a later date. Let us examine the effect
a 'two-stage' decision process on the benefits obtainable to each
participant, as compared to a 'package deal' of design and operation
parameters.
6.1 Package Deal Negotiation
Let us suppose that downstream is unwilling to pay any
sidepayments except for those which might induce US to operate
at F=.25 or F=.50. Negotiation starts at the equilibrium point 6
and US points out that for D=5, the extra benefits from a K=4,
F=.25 over a K=O decision is 5.47. Suspecting that US will build
the reservoir anyway, DS calculates the marginal benefit of a
F=.25 policy over an F=O policy ( 2.03 for D=5) and offers US a
sidepayment equal to the loss US might sustain in operating at
,
F=.25, namely 1.09. This brings us to solution 6 in Figure 1
DS gains 3.38 and US loses as much gross power benefit as it gains
in hard cash.
6.2 A Two Stage Negotiation Scenario:
The Design Negotiation
Both bargainers agree that negotiation starts at solution 6,
yet disagree on cooperative measures to improve the solution.
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The upstream bargainer glances at Table 1 and notices that
solution 5 (K=4, F=O) gives, in net benefits, 7.03 to downstream
for doing nothing. US therefore demands at least 3.5 units (50%)1.
as a sidepayment for constructing the dam. OS rebuffs this
notion claiming that alone, by constructing 0=6, he can obtain at
least 6.56 units of net benefits (solution 3).
us points out that a 0=6 decision by os implies costs of 10
units, whereas for a sidepayment to US of much less than 10 OS
can do better than solution 3.
os reconsiders in the light of his recent budget problems and
offers 3 units of sidepayment to US with the condition that US will
operate at F=.25. US refuses, proposing, that the reservoir design
snould be settled now and the operational problems at a later date.
OS agrees, but reduces his offer to 2.0 units sidepayment and they
I
move to point 5 in Figure 1. OS appears to be worse off than if
he had built the dykes alone but his budget problems constrain his
choices and he believes that significant benefits can be obtained
at little cost to him in the second round of negotiations on
operating policy.
1. This type of arbitrary demand is not unlikely. For example,
the U.S.A. paid Canada one half the present value of expected
annual flood benefits in the U.S.A. due to a dam built in Canada.
See Krutilla, J. "The Columbia River Treaty", John Hopkins,
Baltimore, 1967.
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Negotiations on the Operating Policy
Some time later DS and US negotiate the operating policy.
They first establish a table of marginal benefits and losses
for each participant as a result of a change in operating policy
(F) for various values of D, as in Table 3, below.
D (Dyke Decision)
Change In F 4 5 6 7
From To
-- - I
0 .25 -1. 09, 4.06 -1. 09 , 2.03 -1.09, .47 -1.09, 0.0 i
--
.25 .50 - .63, .16 - .63, .04 - .63,-.15 - .63, 0.0
Table 3 Marginal Net Benefits to Upstream and Downstream
For Changes in Operating Policies
For example, from solution 5, the gain to DS in a change
from F=O to F=.25 is 4.06 and the corresponding loss to US is 1.09.
From Table 3, DS sees that F=.25 is worth more to DS than the
loss to US (if D=4 or 5). Furthermore, an F=.5 policy is
completely dominated by the F=.25 policy in terms of marginal
benefits to DS compared to marginal loss to US.
To obtain the F=.25 solution, DS offers US exactly the value
of DS's loss, assuming D=4, i.e., 1.09 in sidepayrnent. US accepts
willingly and they move to point 9' in Figure 1. Seeing that
D=5 involves a cost of 5 more units for increased benefits of .31
DS decides to stop here.
6.3 Discussion:
i) in the two stage decision result, at point 9' Us is
clearly better off than at 9 but DS asks himself:
i
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i) Does solution 9 dominate 3? In other words is he really
better off with 8.09 net benefits (sidepayment 3.09) over 6.56 net
benefits (costs 5.0). In particular, if his nation's utility for
certain sidepayments is greater than his utility for expected
benefits he may be better off to spend his budget at home
,
(solution 3) than send hard cash abroad (solution 9 ).
Clearly some further understanding of the utility relationship
between sidepayments, benefits and costs is required.
ii) How are DS's options and benefits affected by waiting
to see what US does before building any dykes? DS could accept
strategies such as 'wait one year and then decide' or 'build one
unit of dyke, see what US does and decide if a second unit is
required' and so on. This recursive aspect, including the
interdependency of strategies might be approachable by variations
of recursive game theory or METAGAME theory.
iii) Has either party benefited from a particular type of
negotiation? Table 4 illustrates that, in spite of higher
downstream net benefits in the package deal case, DS may prefer
the two-stage negotiation, depending upon his utility for
sidepayments and costs. For the same. reasons it is not clear from
Table 4 which type of negotiation US prefers.
iv) Which solutions are more 'equitable'? It is clear that
DS is at a disadvantage in bargaining due to the 'upstream -
downstream' nature of the problem. If ｕ ｓ ｾ DS (where ｾ denotes
the direction of wealth transfer) then any solution in which net
benefits for US are greater than 28.57 is inequitable since US
is profiting at DS's expense.
, ,
Hence solutions 5 and 9 are,
inequitable under this definition. On the other hand, if
TABLE 4: The Net positions For Two Negotiating Strategies
Package Deal Two Stage Negotiation
US DS US DS
Decision K=4, F=.25 D=5 K=4, F=.25 D=4
Costs -40.00 -5.0 -40.00 0
Gross 67.48 16.40 67.48 11.09
Benefits
Sidepayments 1. 09 -1.09 2.0+1.09. -2"0-1.09
Net Benefits 28.57 10.31 30.57 8.09
B/C Ratio 1.73 2.7 1. 82 3.58
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ｄｓｾ US, any solution with US net benefits less than 28.57 is
inequitable. Budget constraints, and cost sharing schemes, of
course would refine this rather general definition. Another way
to combine equity and efficiency would be to minimize the
distances of equitable solutions from the efficient one (No. 10 in
Figure 1).
7. Equalization Schemes and Incremax
Allocative decision making regarding the provision of
public goods and services, including locational decisions, have
usually been made on the basis of Pareto-efficiency. It is now
generally accepted, however, that considerations of equity and
distributiv.e justice should be considered in allocative problems
involving conflicts of interest.
As an example, let us suppose that the relative allocation
of storage to power generation and flood control favours upstream
power generation. As a result of increased development of
agriculture downstream, the allocation becomes inefficient and
hence some kind of adjustment is desired so that while efficiency
is assured, both upstream and downstream riparians benefit
'equitably'. Salih (1969) and Wolpert have used an equalization
scheme called 'incremax' to allocate services to two communities
so as to reverse an inequity; the analogy here might be as
follows: negotiate the allocation of storage to flood control
from a position of inequity (point I in Figure 3) to some
equitable position along line AB-(of course, 'equitable'does
not necessarily imply a 50 - 50 split of storage). There is no
doubt that this procedure can tell us how to bargain to find a
point of so-called equity, but how do we get there in the context
of our case example?
100%
%
Storage
for
power
generation
-.-----.-.------".....-----l,,:......l
Min. Flood
improvement set
Incremax bargaining path
z/
Power
-----
Ｏ ｜ ｾ __ Ｍ Ｍ ｊ Ｎ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ｟ ｾ ｾ ｂ ｟ ｾ
Status I
quo
Figure 3
100%
% Storage For
Flood Control
Incremax Bargaining to Redress an Inequity in
Allocation of Storage to Floods and Power Generation.
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It should be noted that the time element is ignored in Salih's
example, yet is a fundamental element in considering wealth
2
transfer •.
8. Multiple Pareto Frontiers
Let us now suppose that the two participants disagree on the
calculations in Table 1; this may come about from:
i) different interest rates used in each of the two countries
ii) different assessments of expected flood dmnages
iii) different production functions for agriculture, power
generation etc.,
iv) deliberate misinformation from one or both participants
The question is how to proceed in negotiation along different
Pareto frontiers as perceived by each of the participants?
9. Staging Dyke Development and Metagame Theory
Suppose that DS sees his choice to be dependent on the US choice.
For example, suppose that DS seems to be following a p?licy whereby
its choice is made to depend on the US choice. Four such policies
are as follows:
i) build 1 unit of dyke (D=5) regardless of what US decides
ii) build no units of dyke (D=4) regardless of what US decides
iii) build no units of dyke (D=4); if US decides K=O, build D=5
iv) build no units (D=4); if US decides K=4, build no extra
units of dyke, etc.
2. One of the conclusions of the Fundacion Bariloche World
Model was that if 2% of the developed world's GNP were transferred
to less developed nations it would take 50 years for wealth to be
distributed evenly.
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To the above four policies many can be added to include
sidepayment conditions, varying operating policies and so on.
The problem can be further complicated if US now views its
choice as dependent on the DS decision, although in this
particular example this is not the case.
The theory of Metagames(Howard, 1968) deals with finding
equilibria in a 'metagame', i.e., a game in which one participant
makes a basic choice and the other makes a policy choice. A
'upstream downstream' metagame is formed from counterpolicies
taken by upstream in view of downstream policies towards upstreams'
basic choice in the original game.
10. Budget Constraints
Two of the six "strategies" presented by Rogers (1969)
involved different budgeting schemes:
Case 5: A joint optimal development plan is made by both
India and Pakistan, subject to the proviso that their budgets are
allocated each to its own region.
Case 6: A joint optimal plan is made in which the separate
budgets are summed together as a regional budget.
Although sidepayments were not considered explicitly, it is
clear in Case 6 that the budget from one country may be spent
inside another.
In our dyke-reservoir example, budget constraints on both
participants may tend to increase the possibility of sidepayments
to upstream for the following reason: if the sidepayment demanded
by US is less than downstream's budget constraint, then DB may be
better off paying a sidepayment than either waiting for more funds
or doing nothing.
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As for upstream under his own budget constraint, he may be
able to convince DS that US funds are insufficient to undertake the
project without a contribution from DS, thus pressuring DS for
support.
11. Weak or Underdeveloped Opponent
Suppose that one participant were 'weak' (no threats to offer)
or underdeveloped (little technology) or poor (no cash available for
sidepayments), or simply in a poor bargaining position (i.e. the
downstream riparian). For a 'fair and equitable' outcome to both
participants, some approach based on other than efficiency
criterion may be required. Game theory with a 'weak opponent'
may provide a basis upon which to formulate strategies to deal with
bargaining problems along a river basin. An interesting note about
Rapoportand Kahan's (1974) work on strong versus weak coalitions is
that in their studies the 'strong' participants form coalitions
against the 'weak'. Does this then imply that the upstream riparians
would combine against the downstream ones?
12. Facility,Location and Concessions Equilibrium
Another approach using equity considerations is the
'concessions equilibrium' technique of Mumphrey (1974). Citizen
opponents of planned facilities (e.g.,reservoirs, airports, nuclear
power plants) may use tactics such as law suits, proposition of
alternate plans, and engagement of outside experts to attack the
engineer's plans. Even if they do not accomplish their goal of
stopping implementation, the delays in construction, facility
redesign, law suits, and other events which surround such opposition
add to the total facility cost. In some cases it is less expensive
to offer sidepayments or concessions (e.g.,recreation facility,
landscaping, new schools etc.) rather than acting defensively to
the opponents' tactics. (Refer to Figures 4 and 5).
1.
Probability of
Interest Group
Opposing Facility
Ｍ Ｍ ｾ Ｍ ｟ ...- ,""-....- '.
ｾ ......
'--------------------_.. ｟ＭＮｾConcessions
Figure 4 Probability of Opposition versus Concessions
Total Expected Cost
of Project
Implementation
"-------------------_." ....
Probability of Opposition
Figure 5 Project cost including concessions versus
probability of Opposition
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The analogy in our dyke - reservoir example, relates to
opposition to the reservoir by interest groups that may exist
upstream or downstream of the proposed location. The concessions
required to reduce the probability of opposition can be applied not
just to regional interest groups but may also transcend
international borders.
So the issue on sidepayments developed previously can not be
viewed solely as it relates to bargaining on reservoir design and
operation; rather it resolved as part of a larger context including'
the placation of interest groups, the relative utility of the
nation and region for sidepayments, and the costs of concession
facilities.
13. Conclusions
The prototype model of Fiering has provided a basis upon which
to outline the upstream - downstream bargaining problem.
Although game theory may provide some insight into strategies
for upstream - downstream cooperation, there is additional work
needed on the relation of water resources development to multiple
interest groups.
To make the model applicable in the context of an international
river basin we should include such aspects as the recursive nature
of the decision problem, interdependency (staging effects) of
strategies, different perceptions of payoffs, equi1ization schemes
and concessions to interest groups, and finally, the addition of
'equity' into our list of multiple objectives.
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